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Abstract
Derivational robustness may increase the degree to which various pieces of evidence
indirectly confirm a robust result. There are two ways in which this increase may come
about. First, if one can show that a result is robust, and that the various individual
models used to derive it also have other confirmed results, these other results may
indirectly confirm the robust result. Confirmation derives from the fact that data not
known to bear on a result are shown to be relevant when it is shown to be robust.
Second, robustness may increase the degree to which the robust result is indirectly
confirmed if it increases the weight with which existing evidence indirectly confirms
it. This may happen when it strengthens the connection between the core and the robust
result by showing that auxiliaries are not responsible for the result.
1. Introduction
Although the basic idea of robustness analysis was introduced long ago (Levins 1966;
Wimsatt 1981), the epistemic benefits have recently evoked increasing interest among
philosophers of science. Robustness is often taken to provide epistemic support because
a result is more likely to be reliable if several different and mutually independent routes
lead to the same conclusion. Such derivations may consist in drawing a conclusion from
a set of data or from theoretical models based on various assumptions. Woodward
(2006) calls the former inferential robustness, and the latter derivational robustness. A
theoretical result is thus derivationally robust if it can be derived from several different
but partly overlapping sets of modelling assumptions. This paper deals exclusively with
derivational robustness.
One of the remaining disputed issues concerns whether robustness provides some
confirmation of the robust result. Kuorikoski et al. (2010) note that robustness is ‘not a
straightforward confirmation procedure’, and Forber (2010) argues that its role is to
limit the set of possible alternatives before empirical testing begins. Orzack and Sober
(1993), Odenbaugh and Alexandrova (2011), as well as Houkes and Vaesen (2012)
staunchly deny that it has any confirmatory power. Weisberg (2006; 2013, pp. 167-9)
claims that robustness analysis does not offer any confirmation of robust theorems, but
if it is combined with ‘low-level confirmation’ it may ‘play a role’ in confirmation.
According to Parker (2011, see also 2010b), one cannot infer from the robustness of a
result that scientists’ confidence in it should be significantly increased.
Derivational robustness analysis is non-empirical in the sense that it does not require
the collection of new data, it is possible in principle to study robustness without ever
considering any empirical evidence, and it never confirms anything in the same sense
as a piece of evidence confirms a theory. There are weaker notions of confirmation to
which robustness may contribute, however. This paper explores the indirect
confirmation of assumptions (Friedman 1953; Machlup 1955; 1956) and of results
(Nagel 1961a; Laudan and Leplin 1991) and the discovery of mathematical or logical
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1983). A hypothesis or a result is indirectly confirmed if there is evidence that confirms
it even though it is not a consequence of the hypothesis.
Models are typically modified and refined, and as a result they spawn families of models
(Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014) with partly overlapping sets of assumptions. Individual
members of a family typically share a set of assumptions that is sometimes called the
common core (see e.g., Levins 1993; Raerinne 2013; Lloyd 2015 for some discussion),
the aim being to capture the workings of a causal mechanism. The purpose of
derivational robustness analysis, then, is to ascertain whether the result is driven mainly
by the core assumptions or by the various auxiliary assumptions that were needed in
formulating the model. Theorists hope to show that the important results do not depend
on auxiliaries, but rather lean on the core assumptions.
I will present an example from climate-change modelling in which derivational
robustness increases the degree of indirect confirmation of a robust result.1 I will show
that stronger confirmation may derive from the fact that some data not previously
known to have a bearing on the result are now relevant. Nevertheless, derivational
robustness may also confirm by ‘strengthening’ the connection between the core and
the robust result, thereby demonstrating that the core rather than the auxiliaries is
responsible for the result. The robustness of climate models may thus increase
confirmation, first through increasing the relevant indirect evidence and second through
increasing the weight of the existing indirect evidence for the robust result.
I refer to the former as the argument from the variety of evidence, and to the latter as
the argument from strengthening the indirect confirmation of a robust result.  I  will
show how the indirect confirmation of a robust result may be strengthened via two
possible routes: strengthening the robust theorem or strengthening the indirect
confirmation of the core. My aim is to analyse the similarities and differences between
these two arguments. As a rough characterisation, the first argument establishes that
there is indirect confirmation of the robust theorem from some piece of evidence, and
the second one strengthens the links in the structure of indirect confirmation that existed
before the robustness was established.
Neither  of  these  arguments  is  entirely  new.  According  to  William  Wimsatt  (1981),
robustness allows identification of the assumptions that really ‘drive’ the robust result
(see also Staley 2004; Kuorikoski, Lehtinen, and Marchionni 2010). Elizabeth Lloyd
(2009; 2010) presents the argument from the variety of evidence and provides case
studies in climate research, but she does not go into the details  of how this happens.
Given that Parker (2009) considers Lloyd’s argument insufficiently developed, and
Wimsatt’s argument has not been explicitly formulated in terms of confirmation, my
aim is primarily to examine the logic of these two arguments very closely, and to show
how they are related to indirect confirmation. Lloyd’s (2015) latest account is more
detailed, but it concentrates on the variety of evidence for individual assumptions in
climate models, and it is not explicitly based on indirect confirmation.
1 Knuuttila and Loettgers (2011) present a case study (on the circadian clock) that also involves the
interplay of data and robustness. See Guillemot (2010) for an account of the interplay of evidence and
models in climate research.
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work of Lloyd (see also 2012) Parker (see also 2010b; 2013), Katzav (2013; 2014) and
a host of other authors.2 I make no attempt to provide a detailed description of climate-
change models either, because sorting out the complicated logic of the role of
robustness in indirect confirmation would require me to resort to counterfactual
scenarios. In fact, I use such scenarios to show that the two arguments are independent
of each other:  robustness may enlarge the set  of relevant pieces of evidence without
strengthening the robust theorem, and it may strengthen confirmation from old evidence
without increasing the variety of evidence.
The structure of this paper is the following. Section 2 introduces the notion of indirect
confirmation (2.1 and 2.2); discusses Okasha’s (1997) critique (2.3) and a response to
it (2.4); shows how it could be applied to modelling (2.5); explains what it means to
say that robustness confirms (2.6); and discusses increasing the indirect confirmation
of the core (2.7). Section 3 presents the arguments from the variety of evidence and
from  strengthening  the  indirect  confirmation  of  a  robust  result  in  an  example  from
climate modelling. Given that the philosophical literature on robustness has thus far not
been couched in terms of confirmation theory, readers who are afraid of being alienated
by the details of such discussions may skip sections 2.3, 2.4, 2.6 and 2.7. If reading
Section 3 raises questions about the argument, they should consult these sections for
further elaboration.
2. Indirect confirmation
2.1 Preliminaries on confirmation
I take ‘x confirms y’ to mean that getting to know x justifiably increases one’s degree
of belief in the truth of y (cf. Steele and Werndl 2013). The modellers’ epistemic
situation (Achinstein 2001, pp. 20-21) specifies which data are available and which
derivational relationships between data and models they know about. If robustness
confirms, it does so through changing the modellers’ epistemic situation. Hence,
confirmation is considered a ‘subjective’ notion in this paper. Nevertheless, when
modellers obtain robust results, and perhaps even when they analyse data, they need
not have the conscious aim of confirming an assumption or a result. The bulk of this
paper analyses different epistemic situations by means of diagrams that represent the
derivational relationships and the available data.
Demonstrations of robustness cannot change the epistemic situation of a logically
omniscient agent. Hence, although the account presented here aims to be non-committal
with respect to specific theories of confirmation, it is inconsistent with any theory that
relies on logical omniscience. I will thus apply accounts of confirming old evidence to
clarify what it means to say that robustness confirms (Sect. 2.6). In that robustness may
only confirm by virtue of changing the modellers’ epistemic situation, and that the
modellers may know too much or too little about the derivational relationships and the
available data, the confirmation it provides may be rather weak.3 However, in that it is
2 See e.g., the special issue (2010, vol. 41) on climate change in Studies in History and Philosophy of
Modern Physics. Räisänen (2007) provides a non-technical introduction by a climatologist.
3 I discuss the context dependence of confirmation via robustness further in Lehtinen (2016). I show,
for example, that robustness may entirely fail to confirm even when there is indirect empirical
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or model (e.g., Schurz 2014a), the notion of confirmation is merely qualitative.
‘Standard’ accounts allow for pseudo-confirmation: every hypothesis with non-zero
prior probability is confirmed by every piece of non-certain evidence E, if H only entails
this evidence. The present account is based on ruling out pseudo-confirmation by
applying accounts of genuine confirmation: Gemes’ (1993; 1994; 2005) account of HD
confirmation  with  ‘content  parts’  is  used  to  show  that  irrelevant  conjuncts  are  not
confirmed (Sect. 2.4), and Schurz’ (2014a; 2014b, pp. 329-331) account of genuine
partial confirmation  is  used  to  show  how  robustness  may  allocate  confirmation  to
individual assumptions (Sect. 2.7). To start with, however, I introduce indirect
confirmation.
2.2 Two kinds of indirect confirmation
A straightforward way of testing a model is to derive some predictions from it and then
to see if they mesh with some data from the real world. Lloyd (2010, p. 974) calls such
agreement between the model and the world the ‘model fit’. If a result concerns the
value  of  a  variable  such  as  the  Global  Mean  Surface  Temperature  (GMST),  for
example, there is model fit if the model values at least roughly match the measured
values (see also Parker 2011).
Evidence E is direct with respect to a hypothesis H (or a result R) if E is a consequence
of H. It can be indirect in two ways (cf. Nagel 1961b, pp. 64-5). First, if a result RM is
derivable,  together  with  other  results  R1,  R2, … from a more general theory T, then
direct evidence (E1, E2, …) for these other results counts as indirect evidence for RM.
Let ci denote the indirect confirmation relation (read xciy as ‘x indirectly confirms y’).
For example, even though RM⊬E1,
           T├R1
E1ciRM if4 ┬ | (1)
              RM  E1
Second, if a hypothesis C can be combined with various auxiliary assumptions A1, A2,
… to entail results R1, R2, … then direct evidence for these results counts as indirect
evidence for C (Machlup 1956). For example, even though C⊬E1,
      (C&A1&A2)├R1 (2)
E1ciC if |
                                               E1
Note, however, that (2) also implies E1ciA1 and  E1ciA2.  Let  us  call  the  first  kind  of
indirectness (1) indirect result confirmation and the second kind (2) indirect
assumption confirmation, and denote them by ܿ௜௥ and ܿ௜௔, respectively.
evidence, but also that it is possible that a given initially non-confirming demonstration of robustness
may become confirmatory later if the epistemic situation is modified in the right way.
4The ‘┬’ and ‘├’ signs refer to the entailment relation, and the vertical line ‘|’ to a direct model fit.
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confirmation in going against underdetermination. Here is how it runs:
Theoretical hypotheses H1 and  H2 are  empirically  equivalent  but
conceptually distinct. H1,  but  not  H2, is derivable from a more general
theory T, which also entails another hypothesis H. An empirical
consequence  e  of  H  is  obtained.  e  supports  H  and  thereby  T.  Thus  e
provides indirect evidential warrant for H1,  of  which  it  is  not  a
consequence, without affecting the credentials of H2.  Thus  one  of  two
empirically equivalent hypotheses or theories can be evidentially
supported to the exclusion of the other by being incorporated into an
independently supported, more general theory that does not support the
other, although it does predict all the empirical consequences of the latter.
(Laudan and Leplin 1991, p. 464)
Let E denote the common empirical consequence of H1 and H2 such that e Ï E.  Letx¢௜௥ݕ denote ‘x does not indirectly confirm y’. The argument could be schematically
represented as follows:
݁ܿ௜
௥ܪଵ because (T├ H) but ݁¢௜௥ܪଶ because (T⊬ H2) (3)
┬ ┬ ┬
    H1   e                                           E
  ┬
     E
Laudan and Leplin use the theory of continental drift as an example of a general theory
T.  H2 could state, for example, that the continents are immobile but were once
connected with ‘bridges’ that have disappeared. Such a hypothesis could explain, say,
the similarities in fauna and flora in the west coast of Africa and the east coast of South
America (E). T implies two more specific hypotheses H1 and H. The first  is  that  the
climate at any given current geographical location has undergone various changes
throughout history (H1), and the second is that the location of the magnetic poles, and
even the direction of the magnetic field, will change over time (H). In the 1950s
scientists observed that there were streaks in the volcanic lava at the bottom of the
ocean. It was further established that the direction of the streaks varied depending on
the timing of the eruption that produced the lava (e). This could be explained in
accordance with continental drift theory: lava that cools down after an eruption aligns
itself according to the positions of the then current magnetic poles (H├e). This piece of
evidence (e) for the second hypothesis (H) also indirectly confirms the first	(݁ܿ௜௥ܪଵ) by
way of confirming the general theory of continental drift (T). Hypotheses with the same
empirical consequences (E) may thus attract differing degrees of evidential support.
This argument challenges the view that a theory may only be evaluated in terms of its
empirical consequences.
Laudan and Leplin use indirect confirmation to argue against underdetermination, but
I only need the part of their argument establishing that indirect confirmation does
indeed provide confirmation, that is, the left side of (3). I need to establish the cogency
of indirect confirmation because Okasha (1997) argued that the left side of (3) is
problematic, and thus that indirect confirmation cannot confirm.
62.3 Okasha’s critique
Laudan (1996, p 67) argues that indirect confirmation depends on the ‘intuitive,
uncontroversial principle that evidential support flows downward across the entailment
relation’. Indeed, Hempel’s (1965, p. 31) special consequence condition (SCC) is based
on this intuition. It states that if an observation report E confirms a hypothesis H, and
if H logically implies that R is  true  (R is a logical consequence of H), then E also
confirms R. To put it  simply, if a hypothesis is confirmed, its consequences are also
confirmed.
As Okasha observes, however, Laudan and Leplin’s argument for the indirect
confirmation of results simultaneously rests on Hempel’s converse consequence
condition (CCC), which states that if E confirms H, and T ├ H, then E confirms T. The
argument is thus based on two conditions that, if taken together, are known to yield
bizarre implications such as the tacking paradox (Hempel 1945, p. 104).5 The problem
is  that  if  E1 confirms T, in accordance with the CCC, it is allowable to formulate a
conjunction T&X when X is any utterly irrelevant proposition such as ‘the moon is
made of green cheese’, and in accordance with the SCC, E1 also confirms X:
     T&X├R1
E1ܿ௜௥X            because ┬ |    (4)
              X     E1
According to Okasha, then, the indirect confirmation of results is problematic because
it must rely simultaneously on the SCC and the CCC, and this allows for the possibility
of confirming irrelevant assumptions and results. If Okasha were right, indirect
confirmation would be questionable because it would be possible to indirectly confirm
just about any preposterously false hypothesis.
However, Okasha’s argument is seriously misleading because the problem of tacking
does not primarily derive from the incompatibility of Hempel’s conditions. As Glymour
(1980, pp. 133-5; 1983) suggests, the tacking-by-conjunction problem affects any
confirmation theory that is based on the entailment relation. It is well known, for
example, that Bayesians face the same problem when the hypothesis entails the
evidence. Although Laudan notes this, he does not develop the argument fully, which
is what I will attempt to do here. I will now show that this problem can be solved by
replacing the entailment relation with the content part relation (Gemes 1993).
2.4 Content parts and natural axiomatizations
As Glymour notes, the problem with traditional HD accounts of confirmation was that
they were too liberal: evidence E was taken to confirm a hypothesis H if H├E as long
as H was consistent and E was not tautological. Because H&X├E if H├E, E confirms
H&X  for  any  X.  No  consideration  was  given  to  whether  deriving  E  from  H&X
depended on using both conjuncts. However, the tacking problem can be solved even
in an HD framework by imposing further conditions on the confirmation relationship
(Gemes 1993; 1994; 2005; Schurz 1991; 1994). Gemes’ solution is based on replacing
the notion of entailment with the content part relation, and on the idea that the theory
5 Niiniluoto and Tuomela (1973, pp. 3-4) present essentially the same argument as Okasha but without
using the term ‘indirect confirmation’, and Bangu (2006) re-employs the argument but without
mentioning Hempel’s result.
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formulas (wff) of a language, and let β be a variable for the wffs and sets of wffs of the
same language. The content-part relation is denoted β├c α,  and is defined as follows
(1993, p. 481):
α is a content part of β iff α and β are contingent, β├ α, and there is no σ
such that β├ σ, σ is stronger than α, and every atomic wff that occurs in σ
occurs in α.
To  say  that  σ is  stronger  than  α means  that  σ├α and α⊬σ.  In  plain  English,  this
definition  states  that  α is  a  content  part  of  β if  β entails  α,  and  in  addition  α is  the
strongest possible consequence that can be derived from β. The content-part relation is
also used to define the notion of a natural axiomatization n(T):
T’ is a natural axiomatization of T iff (i) T’ is a finite set of wffs such that
T’ is logically equivalent to T, (ii) every member of T’ is a content part of
T’, and (iii) no content part of any member of T’ is entailed by the set of
the remaining members of T’.
The notion represents an attempt to express what exactly a given theory says about the
world. Another option is to state that a n(T) does not contain any redundant axioms
(ibid., p. 482). Condition (iii) expresses the idea that the axioms should be independent
of one another. Gemes’ account of HD confirmation is thus the following (ibid., p. 486):
E HD confirms axiom A of theory T relative to background evidence B,
iff E is a content part of (T&B), and there is no natural axiomatization n(T)
of T such that for some subset S of the axioms of n(T), E is a content part
of (S&B) and A is not a content part of (S&B).
This strengthened definition of HD confirmation disposes of the problem of tacking.6
As Glymour (1980, pp. 30-31) notes, nobody denies the intuitive plausibility of SCC
and CCC. If Hempel’s conditions are reformulated with the content-part relation rather
than the entailment relation, they are not inconsistent.
2.5 Indirect confirmation, models and robustness
Derivational robustness is a matter of investigating whether similar results can be
derived from a family of models. Hence, to illustrate the modellers’ inferences, models
are presented as conjunctions of assumptions. For example, writing M1 =
(A1&A2&A3)├ R means that assumptions A1, A2, and A3 are being used to derive result
R from model M1. Although accounts that emphasise the importance of inferential
issues in modelling would be particularly suitable (Suárez 2004; Kuorikoski and
Lehtinen 2009), this way of presenting modelling inferences does not imply a
commitment to any specific interpretation of what models are. As a matter of fact, it
would be possible to remove the symbols indicating models (M1,  M2 etc.)  in  the
analyses that follow, but they are retained because they provide notational shorthand
for the various combinations of assumptions.
6 I do not intend to argue for HD as opposed to other accounts of confirmation by applying Gemes’
account, and neither did Gemes by presenting it (see e.g., Gemes 1993).
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context of a family of models. If entailment were the relevant relationship between
models and their results, then if, for example, model M1 were to entail a result R1, and
if E1 were to support R1,
M1=(C&A1&A2&A3)├ R1, (2’)
                                        |
                                       E1
E1 would confirm not only M1 and all the individual assumptions in it, but also every
imaginable assumption that could be tacked onto M1 and thus also the infamous ‘green
cheese’ model Mgc = (C&A1&A2&A3&X). Furthermore, its consequence X would be
indirectly result-confirmed.
Mgc=(C&A1&A2&A3&X)├ R1, (2’gc)
┬                          |
                  X                         E1
Let us apply the definition of natural axiomatization to confirming the infamous model
Mgc =  (C&A1&A2&A3&X)  with  evidence  E1.  Mgc is not a natural axiomatization
because by eliminating X we obtain a natural axiomatization of the model M1 =
(C&A1&A2&A3) such that the set of axioms in M1 constitute a subset of the axioms in
Mgc,  E1 is  a  content  part  of  M1,  but  X  is  not.  The  irrelevant  premise  X  is  thus  not
indirectly confirmed (qua assumption or qua result), and the problem of tacking is
solved.
Modellers typically have extensive background knowledge concerning the truth values
of the various assumptions and whether they take part in deriving various results. The
first kind of background knowledge may come from previous indirect assumption
confirmations (or disconfirmations), from direct empirical tests of individual
assumptions, from comparison to theory, or from intuitive judgments on the plausibility
of the assumptions. Both kinds of background knowledge are crucial for judging
whether the models can be taken to be reliable, plausible, or adequate for purpose.
It is important to stress, however, that the analysis of the confirmatory benefits of
robustness ignores all direct confirmation or disconfirmation of assumptions unless
explicitly indicated otherwise (i.e., in subsections 2.7 and 3.2). This means that, even if
X were to have been re-interpreted as, say, some auxiliary in a climate model, it would
have been ignored by the current analysis on the ground that X alone entails X, and
direct evidence for or against any assumption is ignored. In other words, only indirect
confirmation of assumptions is relevant background knowledge for the analysis, and it
is relevant only insofar as such knowledge indicates that there is some uncertainty
concerning the truth value of a given assumption. If modellers already know that an
assumption is true or false, such an assumption cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed
by means of robustness. Furthermore, ignoring direct confirmation or disconfirmation
also implies that the analysis presented in this paper cannot take any position on
whether the models should be taken to be reliable, plausible, or merely adequate for
evaluating some individual results. Yablo (2014, pp. 100-1) distinguishes between fully
and basically confirming a conjunction. In the former case E1 would ‘probabilify’ (i.e.,
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the latter case E1 merely  probabilifies  the  conjunction  M1. The (climate) models
discussed in this paper are clearly far too complex and contain far too many
idealisations to be fully confirmed.
Although robustness affects the overall evaluation of the models through the evaluation
of  the  plausibility  of  various  results  and  assumptions,  it  is  not  sufficient  in  itself  to
dramatically change modellers’ judgments on their overall reliability. This is because a
result may only become robust if it has already been derived at least once. If the result
was important and there was confirming evidence for it, most of the confirmation
relevant for judging the overall reliability of the models would already have been
obtained from the first derivation. Nevertheless, robustness may incrementally confirm
even when modellers judge the overall performance of the model ensemble to be poor.
In other words, the epistemic benefits of robustness do not depend on the models being
already considered reliable. If they are unreliable, the absolute confirmation remains
low even for results that are shown to be robust.
The evaluation of models typically involves an investigation of the similarities and
differences among various results in a family of models. I will be analysing epistemic
situations that combine the two kinds of indirect confirmation:
        (C&A1&A2&A3)├R1
E1ܿ௜௥RM if ┬ |                     (2’M)
                     RM             E1
Readers are advised to study the diagrams carefully because they help to show how
robustness contributes to confirmation. No formal results will be established, however.
The strength with which pieces of evidence such as E1 confirm model components such
as C or conclusions such as RM varies from one epistemic situation to another and, more
importantly, depends on robustness. From now on I will take as given that E1 may
indirectly confirm RM in (2’M).  It  should  be  clear  from  the  discussion  on  tacking,
however, that E1 indirectly confirms result RM only if RM and R1 are mostly attributable
to  the  same  elements  (such  as  C).  The  indirect  confirmation  of  result  RM vanishes
entirely if it is shown to depend on different assumptions than R1. This is close to what
confirmation theorists call mere content-cutting (Earman 1992, p. 98; Schurz 2014a;
2014b, pp. 320-2; Votsis 2014; Gemes undated). If modellers start with something like
(2’M), there are plenty of possibilities for cutting the content of R1 from that of RM.
2.6 Incremental confirmation of old evidence
Let us now consider exactly what it means to say that robustness confirms when it does
indeed confirm. The notion of confirmation used in this paper is incremental. To say
that confirmation is incremental means that if something is confirmed, there is an
increase in the degree to which it is confirmed, but there is no guarantee that any
specific level or threshold of confirmation is reached. The level of absolute
confirmation may thus remain rather low (e.g., Schurz 2014b, p. 318). In Bayesian
incremental confirmation a piece of evidence E confirms hypothesis H incrementally
given background beliefs B iff P(H|E&B)> P(H|B). However, unlike in such accounts,
robustness increases confirmation not because a new piece of evidence is found, but
rather because there is a change in the epistemic situation concerning derivational
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relations. Standard accounts of old evidence (Garber 1983; Jeffrey 1983; Niiniluoto
1983) posit that deriving a confirmed result E from a hypothesis H increases the prior
probability of that hypothesis so that P(H|H├E)>P(H). If robustness confirms, the
confirmation increment resembles that in accounts of old evidence.
A robust theorem concerns the relationship between the joint core C and the robust
result RM. The general form of the robust theorem is ‘ceteris paribus, if [common core
structure] obtains, then [robust result] will obtain’ (Weisberg and Reisman 2008;
Weisberg 2006; Lloyd 2010; Houkes and Vaesen 2012). The core never implies the
robust result all by itself, but rather entails it together with auxiliary assumptions.
Several different sets of auxiliaries entail the robust result if combined with the core,
but robust theorems are never completely cleansed of all auxiliary assumptions. Indeed,
insofar as the theorem in question is robust rather than genuine, modellers are not able
to tell exactly which assumptions are needed for deriving the robust result. (RR) thus
provides a description of an epistemic situation with a robust result:
M1 = (C&A1&A2&A3)├ RM, R1
M2 = (C&A2&A4&A5)├ RM (RR)
M3 = (C&A1&A6&A7)├ RM,
Recall that in Laudan and Leplin’s example,
݁ܿ௜
௥ܪଵ because (T├ H) but ݁¢௜௥ܪଶ because (T⊬ H2). (3)
┬ ┬ ┬
    H1   e                                           E
  ┬
     E
Let us now see the similarities and differences in epistemic situations between
robustness (RR) and Laudan and Leplin’s example. The confirming empirical evidence
(e) is not entailed by hypothesis (H1) in Laudan and Leplin’s account, but this
hypothesis is nevertheless indirectly confirmed because it is a consequence of a more
general theory (T), which entails another hypothesis (H) that is confirmed by empirical
evidence (e). The robust result RM is indirectly confirmed because it is the joint
consequence of the common core structure C in a family of models, and R1 is confirmed
and shown to depend crucially on C. This common core C in a family of models thus
replaces the role of a general theory T in Laudan and Leplin’s account of indirect
confirmation.
Their argument supporting the claim that the changing-climate hypothesis H1 but not
the ‘bridge’ hypothesis H2 is confirmed by evidence e depends crucially on the fact that
H1 but not H2 can be derived from the more general theory T. Clearly, it cannot be that
P(H1|H1├e)>P(H1) simply because H1⊬e, and e confirms H1 only if T├ H, T├ H1, and
H├ e. In other words, streaks in lava at the bottom of the ocean (e) were considered
irrelevant for the changing-climate hypotheses (H1) until this hypothesis was shown to
be a consequence of a general theory T (T├H1) that also explained the streaks (T├H).
If the basic idea in accounts of old evidence is applied to Laudan and Leplin’s example,
an increment in confirmation that derives from coming to know derivational
relationships could be written as follows:
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P(H1|(T├H)&(H├e)&(T├H1))>P(H1).
Here P(H1) denotes the prior probability of hypothesis H1 when the background
knowledge does not include information on the derivational relationships, and
P(H1|(T├H)&(H├e)&(T├H1)) denotes the prior when it does.
The account is similar in the case of robustness. Consider again (2’M):
        (C&A1&A2&A3)├R1
E1ܿ௜௥RM if ┬ |                     (2’M)
                     RM             E1
E1 would indirectly confirm RM if modellers somehow knew that E1 could not cut the
content of (C&A1&A2&A3) in such a way that the confirmation would not reach RM. If
C alone implied RM and R1, they would know that such content cutting was impossible.
The increment in confirmation would then be
P(RM|(C├RM)&(C├R1)&(R1├E1))>P(RM).
The assumption throughout this paper is that modellers know that R1├E1, so that this
could be simplified as
P(RM|(C├RM)&(C├R1))>P(RM).                     (ICR)
However, because robustness never establishes that C alone entails RM or R1, it alone
never  brings  the  modellers  to  the  epistemic  situation  (ICR):  it  is  always  possible,  in
principle, that E1 cuts the content of (C&A1&A2&A3)  in  such  a  way  that  RM is  not
confirmed at all. This would happen, for example, if it turned out that C&A1├R1 and
A2&A3├RM.
Let us now describe modellers’ knowledge of the derivational relationship between
assumptions and results as follows. Let Ai├0R1 denote the epistemic situation in which
they do not know anything about the derivational relationship between Ai and R1. In
other  words,  in  this  situation  the  modellers  think  that  Ai and  R1 are completely
unrelated, and by definition P(RM|(C├0RM)&(C├0R1))= P(RM).  Let  Ai├ ◊cpR1 denote
the situation in which the modellers know at least something about the derivational
relationship between Ai and R1, and as far as they know, Ai could be needed for deriving
R1. Let +┬c and +├c denote the change in the epistemic situation that robustness brings
about when it shows that a specific assumption is needed for a result.
If an assumption Ai is indirectly assumption-confirmed due to the robustness of R1
(recall that R1├E1), then the change in the modellers’ epistemic situation could be
represented as follows: P(Ai|(Ai+├cE1))>P(Ai) or 	[ܧଵ]+ܿ௜௔ܣ௜. Thus, if C is assumption-
confirmed by R1, P(C|(C+├cR1))>P(C).
Suppose now that the modellers start in an epistemic situation in which RM is not known
to be robust and C is not known to be relevant to RM or R1 for some other reason (i.e.,
C is not known to take part in a derivation of RM or R1):
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P(RM|(C├0RM)&(C├0R1))= P(RM).
Learning that C+├cR1 changes the epistemic situation into
P(RM|(C├0RM)&(+C├cR1))= P(RM).                    (IAC)
The equality sign in this formulation makes it clear that indirect assumption-
confirmation  of  the  core  (IAC)  due  to  the  robustness  of  R1 is not sufficient in itself
indirectly to confirm the result RM. It will do so only if the modellers know that there
is some derivational relationship between C and RM. If C├RM were also known to hold,
the epistemic situation could be described as follows.
P(RM|(C├RM)&(C+├cR1))>P(RM),
However, modellers are never assumed to know that C├RM, but rather something
weaker such as the robustness of RM. Yet, if they start with at least some knowledge of
the relationship between C and RM,
P(RM|(C├◊cpRM)&(C├0R1))= P(RM),
and the robustness of R1 then changes the epistemic situation into
P(RM|(C├◊cpRM)&(C+├cR1)) > P(RM),                 (SICC)
robustness confirms RM indirectly and incrementally by Strengthening the Indirect
Confirmation of the Core (SICC). Similarly, if they start with
P(RM|(C├0RM)&(C├◊cpR1)),
and the robustness of RM then changes the epistemic situation into
P(RM|(C+├cRM)&(C├◊cpR1)) > P(RM),                   (SRT)
robustness confirms RM indirectly and incrementally by Strengthening the Robust
Theorem (SRT).
However, the modellers do not necessarily start with no information about the
derivational relationships. If they start with
P(RM|(C├◊cpRM)&(C├◊cpR1))=P(RM),
robustness confirms as long as there is an increment via either SICC:
P(RM|(C├◊cpRM)&(C+├cR1))>P(RM) or SRT: P(RM|(C+├cRM)&(C├◊cpR1))>P(RM).
Thus, when modellers start from some initial epistemic situation, strengthening the
indirect confirmation of a robust result may happen through strengthening either the
C-RM link or the C-R1 link. This explains why the strengthening argument has two
possible routes: strengthening the robust theorem (SRT) and strengthening the indirect
confirmation of the core (SICC).
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The inequalities in SRT and SICC implicitly refer to evidence E1 in the sense that R1├
E1 is assumed to hold, and in the sense that they concern how E1 would confirm RM if
it were to become available. They are deliberately written without mentioning E1,
however, to highlight the fact that E1 is not necessarily assumed to be available, and
robustness does not contribute to whether it is or not. Furthermore, modellers cannot
learn SRT and SICC at the same time as they learn that a piece of evidence (E1) arrives.
If the evidence is already available when SRT or SICC are learned, it is old. If it (i.e.,
E1)  is  not  already  available,  robustness  cannot  confirm  via  E1. However, when the
evidence arrives, it then confirms RM more when the modellers have knowledge about
the derivational relations in SRT and SICC than it would in the counterfactual situation
in which they do not have such knowledge. It thus increases the Bayesian increment in
a counterfactual sense. This explains why studying counterfactual scenarios is not
merely a convenient way of speculating: it is rather an indispensable aspect of the
confirmation relation, just as in some accounts of confirmation with old evidence
(Howson 1991; see also Sprenger 2015).
The aim in this subsection was to articulate what it means to say that robustness
confirms, without trying to justify that it confirms. Note, however, that SRT and SICC
do not rule out the kind of content-cutting that would remove the indirect confirmation
of  RM altogether. For example, if robustness now shows that
P(RM|(C├◊cpRM)&(C+├cR1)) > P(RM), it is possible at least in principle for later
investigations to show that C is not needed to derive RM or R1. The possibility of such
content-cutting would be entirely removed only if the weaker derivational relationships
(including entailments) were all replaced by content part relations in the final epistemic
situation:
P(RM|(C├cRM)&(C├cR1))>P(RM).
The relationships between the assumptions and the results can be conceptualised in
terms of sufficient conditions: the set of assumptions used for deriving a result provides
a set of sufficient conditions for it, and several models provide a collection of such sets
of sufficient conditions. Accordingly, modellers can establish that some auxiliaries are
not relevant for some results, but insofar as they are not able to provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for a result, they are not able to conclusively establish that C├cRM
or C├cR1. In other words, the inequalities in SRT and SICC must hold even when the
modellers have less than complete information about the derivational relationships.
Logically omniscient modellers could perhaps establish that such content part relations
hold, but then robustness would no longer be useful because there would be no
epistemic uncertainty. The account presented here is based on the premise that
approaching logical omniscience counts as progress even if it can never be reached.
The point is that robustness may confirm precisely because showing that false
auxiliaries are not responsible for the results removes some possibilities of content-
cutting.
Robustness can thus confirm through strengthening the indirect assumption
confirmation only if there is epistemic uncertainty concerning which results depend on
which assumptions. Here the logical learning concerns the relationship between results
and individual assumptions rather than scientific theories, which is why logical learning
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is always weaker than entailment in the sense that modellers never learn that any Ai
alone entails any result.7
The argument that robustness may confirm requires several further steps. The next
subsection shows that robustness can confirm individual assumptions.
2.7 Strengthening the indirect confirmation of the core
I  will  now show how the link between C and R1 can be strengthened via robustness.
Below I set out my argument explaining why the robustness of a confirmed result (such
as  R1) may increase the indirect assumption confirmation of the core. Some results
depend more than others on some assumptions. A given premise is irrelevant for a given
conclusion if and only if the conclusion can be derived with or without it (Schurz 1991).
Gemes and Schurz’ contributions formalise the idea that irrelevant premises are not
confirmed even if they are included in a conjunction of premises that entail some
confirmed result. Only the conjuncts that are needed for deriving a piece of confirming
evidence (E1) are indirectly assumption-confirmed by it. Increasing the indirect
confirmation of the core requires that confirmation of a confirmed result can be
allocated to individual assumptions, namely the core.
In what follows I use the expression ‘set A is more likely to be needed (or necessary)
for deriving result RM’ to indicate that at least some epistemic uncertainty concerning
what depends on what is resolved. Showing the robustness of a result changes the
modellers’ epistemic situation by increasing the likelihood that a specific set of
assumptions, the core rather than the auxiliaries, is needed for deriving the result. This
may increase the indirect confirmation of individual assumptions such as the core. If
there is an increment in confirmation of an individual assumption Ai due robustness, it
is because Ai is shown to be needed for deriving E1. When there is such an increase, it
may be possible to write P(Ai|(Ai+├cE1))>P(Ai).
Confirmation requires evidence. Robustness provides information about which
assumptions are needed for which result if there is no evidence at all, but it cannot
increase confirmation. Although information about derivational relationships can be
used for allocating indirect confirmation only when there is at least some empirical
evidence, it is worth emphasising that the derivational relationships and the
confirmation relationships are separate: bringing in new knowledge about derivational
relationships may justifiably increase confidence in the robust theorem or in the
relevance  of  an  assumption  to  a  result,  but  such  knowledge  cannot increase
confirmation if there is no empirical evidence.
Thus, if modellers derive (2*) and (2**),
M1=(C&A1&A2&A3)├ R1 (2*)
M2=(C&A2&A4&A5)├ R1, (2**)
they know that C and A2 are more likely to be needed for deriving R1 but they are no
more certain than before because there is no confirmatory evidence in the first place.
Thus, if they learn (2**) after having learned (2*), they will not find out that, say, A3 is
no longer indirectly confirmed. They will merely learn that A3 is not needed for deriving
7 See Hartmann & Fitelson (2015) for an account in which old evidence confirms even in cases weaker
than entailment.
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R1. Under epistemic uncertainty concerning what follows from what, it is reasonable to
assume that any derivation that uses an individual assumption Ai to derive a result R
increases modellers’ confidence that Ai is needed.
Given that derivational and confirmatory relationships are separate, and that robustness
affects only the former directly, it is possible to write Ai+├cR1 if the robustness of R1
makes  it  more  likely  that  Ai is needed for deriving R1.  One  could  now  write
(C&A2)+├cR1 to indicate that (C&A2) is more likely to be necessary for deriving result
R1 when the modellers derived (2**) after having derived (2*). If C and A2 are more
indirectly confirmed due to robustness it is because P(C|(C+├cR1))  >  P(C)  and
P(A2|(A2+├cR1)) > P(A2) when E1 is available. Because the derivation can be conducted
before or after evidence E1 arrives, robustness does not confirm if it is established
before E1 is available. Let us express an increment in confirmation as follows: E1+c௜௔C
and  E1+c௜௔A2.  E1+c௜௔C  is  an  example  of increasing the indirect assumption-
confirmation of the core.
Given that I only discuss cases with empirical evidence in this paper, it is not necessary
to emphasise the strict separation between the derivational and the confirmatory
relationships in all of what follows.8 If an assumption is demonstrably not needed for
deriving R1, it cannot confirm R1. By way of an illustration, suppose that modellers
start with (2'):
M1=(C&A1&A2&A3)├ R1, (2’)
                                       |
                                      E1
Insofar as the modellers do not already know that some assumptions are not needed for
deriving R1, (2’) initially means that all the assumptions in M1 are indirectly confirmed
by E1: E1ܿ௜௔C, E1ܿ௜௔A1, E1ܿ௜௔A2, and E1ܿ௜௔A3. To say that an assumption Ai is indirectly
confirmed by some piece of evidence thus does not mean that it is true, or even close
to being true. Indeed, modellers’ background knowledge often indicates that some
specific auxiliaries are clearly false. Such auxiliaries thus have direct disconfirming
evidence. Suppose, for example, that the modellers knew that A3 was  false.  The
epistemic situation could be described as follows:
M1=(C&A1&A2&A3)├ R1, (2’f)
┬      |
                             ~EA3    E1
EA3 is a piece of direct evidence concerning A3. If the modellers are interested in the
truth  value  of  A3 they should weigh the direct disconfirming evidence against the
indirect confirming evidence. They may well end up with the judgement that the direct
disconfirming evidence clearly outweighs the indirect confirming evidence. Suppose
they then learn that (2’’) holds.
M2=(C&A2&A4&A5)├ R1 (2’’)
                                       |
                                      E1
8 See Hands (2016) for a study of robustness with virtually no empirical evidence.
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After having learned (2’’), A1, A3, A4, and A5 are no longer indirectly confirmed by E1:
E1¢௜௔A1, E1¢௜௔A3,… Schurz (2014a) argues that an increase in H’s probability P(H|E) >
P(H) spreads from H to an E-transcending content part A of H (P(A|E) > P(A)) only if
A is  necessary  within  H to  make  E highly  probable.  In  other  words,  there  exists  no
conjunction  H*  of  content  elements  of  H  that  makes  E  at  least  equally  probable
(P(E|H*)≥P(E|H)) but does not entail A. Schurz thus provides a Bayesian analogue to
the  claim  that  irrelevant  conjuncts  are  not  confirmed.  In  this  example,  the  only  E1-
transcending content parts of M2 that can be necessary to make E1 highly probable are
C and A2.
Deriving (2’’) must increase the indirect confirmation of the assumptions (C and A2)
that were involved in both derivations, i.e. assumptions at the intersection of the two
sets. This reasoning is based on Mill’s method of agreement: C and A2 are the only
components that the two models share, thus it seems natural to assume that they explain
the similarity in results.
Just like all applications of Mill’s methods, such inferences are fallible. If, for example,
modellers misidentify the assumptions in the models, or if deriving the results requires
a combination of several assumptions rather than just one, they may be led astray. Given
my focus on the case with robust results that require combinations of assumptions
(Lehtinen 2016; see also Lisciandra 2017), I only discuss misidentification here.
Suppose, for example, that A3 and A4 are not genuinely different assumptions, but that
they rather share a common component A34, and distinguishing components A3’ and
A4’: A3=A34&A3’ and A4=A34&A4’. This would mean that the models should have been
written  as  follows:  M1=(C&A1&A2&A34&A3’)  and  M2=(C&A2&A34&A4’&A5), and
that the increased indirect confirmation would be spread among a larger number of
assumptions: E1+c௜௔C, E1+c௜௔A2 and E1+c௜௔A34. Thus, insofar as A34 would not turn out
later to be irrelevant for deriving R1, the increment in the indirect assumption
confirmation of C and A2 would be smaller due to robustness.  This would mean that
robustness analysis would be less complete in the sense that more shared assumptions
would remain. Such failure to identify common assumptions in models is particularly
dangerous because the modellers will think that C is more indirectly assumption-
confirmed by E1 than it ought to be.
3. Increasing confirmation through robustness
3.1 An example from climate modelling
Let us now consider the climate models that Lloyd (2010) discusses. Let C stand for
‘increase in greenhouse gases’ and let RM stand for ‘increased GMST in the future’.9
9 ‘Future temperature increase’ and ‘increase in greenhouse gases’ may refer to various things but the
details are not needed in this paper. There are different scenarios of future CO2 emissions and various
ways to conceptualise future temperature increases. Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity (ECS) determines
the long-term equilibrium warming response to stable atmospheric composition, but does not account
for vegetation or ice-sheet changes. Transient Climate Response (TCR) is a measure of the magnitude
of transient warming while the climate system, particularly the deep ocean, is not in equilibrium; and
Transient Climate Response to Cumulative CO2 emissions (TCRE) is a measure of the transient
warming response to a given mass of CO2 injected into the atmosphere, and combines information on
both the carbon cycle and climate response. TCR is estimated with high confidence to be likely between
1°C and 2.5°C and extremely unlikely to be greater than 3°C (Bindoff and Stott 2013, pp. 6, 59-60).
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The family of models contains some common assumptions C as well as variable further
assumptions Ai,  and  a  robust  result  RM can be derived from each individual model.
Lloyd’s  example  of  a  robust  theorem  is:  ‘Ceteris  paribus,  C├ RM’. What has been
established is something like this:
M1 = (C&A1&A2&A3)├ RM
M2 = (C&A2&A4&A5)├ RM   (5)
M3 = (C&A1&A6&A7)├ RM,
and the robust theorem (henceforth abbreviated as ‘cp, C├ RM’) is taken to follow from
such derivations. Lloyd expresses the robust theorem as follows. ‘Ceteris paribus, if
[Greenhouse gases relate in lawlike interaction with the energy budget of the earth]
obtains, then the [increased global mean temperature] will obtain’ (p. 980). The
mechanism responsible for the increase in temperature is the following. Some of the
radiation from the sun reaches the earth’s surface and heats it. The radiation is then re-
emitted from the surface in all directions. Some of the thus re-emitted radiation is
absorbed by the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, resulting in a higher surface
temperature than there would be in the absence of such gases. The reason why there is
more radiation coming into the earth than exiting it is that the incoming radiation from
the sun has a shorter wavelength than that which is re-emitted from the ground. The
radiation from the sun goes through the greenhouse gases into the Earth, but due to the
longer wavelength only some of it exits the atmosphere.
C refers to greenhouse-gas forcing in climate models in the past and in the future. Let
RT denote the increase in the GMST in the past. One could also formulate another robust
theorem (cp, C├RT)  concerning  the  causes  of  the  historical  development.  A robust
property or a result (RM or RT) is different from a robust theorem. Let us imagine that
the theorem is false, in other words that CO2 emissions do not increase the temperature.
It is clear in that case that evidence for RT cannot confirm C even if both RT and C were
true. Neither can evidence for RT confirm the robust theorem itself.
Proponents of robustness argue that the robustness of RM increases modellers’
confidence in the robust theorem: (5) makes the robust theorem more plausible.
Because direct evidence for (RT) does not fit the bill, it would be inappropriate to call
this increase in confidence an increase in confirmation because it derives purely from
derivational relationships. Yet, as I explained in (Lehtinen 2016), although the
derivational relationships do not yet constitute confirmation, they are a necessary but
not sufficient condition for confirming the theorem. The main point in this paper is to
establish whether RM, the robust result of increased GMST in the future, is confirmed.
I deliberately selected a case in which there cannot be direct evidence for the robust
result  RM to show that the confirmation must be based on indirect rather than direct
evidence.
Climate models within an ‘ensemble’ (see e.g., Parker 2010b; 2013; Tebaldi and Knutti
2007; Knutti et al. 2010) differ in terms of their auxiliaries, of which the
‘parameterizations’ are the most important (see Gramelsberger 2010). They concern
processes that cannot be explicitly represented, either because of their complexity (e.g.,
biochemical processes of vegetation) or because the discretised model equations in the
simulations cannot resolve the spatial and/or temporal scales on which they occur (e.g.,
cloud formation and turbulence) (Flato and Marotzke 2013, p. 9). A3 could thus
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represent one way in which cloud formation is parameterized, and A5 another; A1 could
represent one way in which vegetation is parameterized; A2 could be one way in which
turbulence is parameterized, and A6 another, and so on. These auxiliaries are usually
considered problematic because the parameterized factors are known to affect the
climate. Indeed, the very idea of studying ensembles rather than single models in
isolation is based, in part, on the realisation of their problematic nature. The direct
disconfirming evidence for the auxiliaries is not explicitly represented in the diagrams,
however, to avoid clutter.
The climate displays ‘internal variability’: the weather system is intrinsically chaotic.
Climate models typically study ‘forcing’, in other words how changing various relevant
factors affects the climate. Typical forcing factors include both anthropogenic
(greenhouse gases such as CO2 and aerosols) and natural (solar and volcanic) elements.
Before proceeding to analyse Lloyd’s model ensemble, let me briefly comment on the
idealisations and abstractions used in depicting the various examples described in this
paper. The point is to highlight the logic of robustness and indirect confirmation by
stripping away various kinds of detail. The strategy is to see the difference that
robustness makes by counterfactually investigating how the epistemic situation would
change if a result were shown to be robust.
When climate modellers run computer simulations with general circulation models,
they obtain a mass of results from a single simulation. This reflects the fact that they
involve large numbers of auxiliaries and physical theories. A single model thus
typically looks something like this:
M11=(C&A1&A2&A3&A11&A12&A13,…)├ RT, RH, RP, RR,…   (5’)
RT could stand for the temperature in history for example, RH the height of the
tropopause, RP patterns of precipitation, RR pressure,  and so on. If  the model is  also
used to predict future weather, it also generates a set of predictions for various emission
scenarios RC1T, RC1H,…,RC2T, RC2H, and so on. When another model M2 is simulated,
the large number of results give ample opportunity to strengthen the robust theorem:
M12=(C&A2&A4&A5&A14&A15&A16,…)├RT, RH, RP, RR,… (5’’)
However, the results on a given variable are never numerically identical in two different
models, and even a single model yields numerically different results with different
initial conditions. Thus, establishing that a result derived from model M1 counts the
same as the corresponding result derived from M2 requires a judgment concerning how
large a divergence in results is acceptable. In what follows, complications concerning
several emission scenarios and the numerical non-identity of results will be completely
ignored, and the results from the various models will be assumed to be the same. The
reason for using such an idealisation is that if the numerical difference is large enough,
the results are no longer robust. However, if the results from climate models are not
robust, then they obviously cannot be confirmed by robustness. Given that climate
scientists rather than philosophers are in the best position to evaluate the degree to
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which the results are indeed robust, I will leave it to them.10 Yet, a philosophical account
of the consequences of robustness cannot do otherwise but assume that the results are
indeed robust.
As will soon become clear, the argument from the variety of evidence requires at least
some model-specific results, and indeed, some results are not derived in every model.
For example, Australians might derive results for surface seawater temperature in the
Tasman sea, whereas Europeans might be concerned with the extent of summer sea ice
in the Arctic.
In principle, one could conduct the analysis with a representation like this:
(M1├ RT,RH,RP,…,R1), (M2├ RT,RH,RP,…,R2), (M3├ RT,RH,RP,…,R3)
 ┬ | | | | ┬ | | | | ┬ | | | | (5E)
RM     ET  EH EP     E1      RM   ET  EH  EP      E2    RM   ET  EH  EP      E3
where, for example, ET is the evidence on GMST in history, EH for the height of the
tropopause and EP for patterns of precipitation; R1 is a result concerning the surface
seawater temperature in the Tasman sea and E1 confirming evidence for it; R2 a result
concerning the extent of summer sea ice in the Arctic and E2 the corresponding
evidence, and so on.11 However, the multiple robustness of the models with respect to
RT, RH and RP would merely confuse the reader at this point. I will thus depict three
members from the family of models in Lloyd (2010) such that only model-specific
results and evidence in favour of them are explicitly represented.
(M1├ R1), (M2├ R2), (M3├ R3)   (6)
┬ | ┬ | ┬ |
                        RM     E1     RM    E2     RM   E3
This representation of Lloyd’s model ensemble abstracts from the robustness of
confirmed results (RT,  RH,  RP) to concentrate on the effects of evidence for model-
specific confirmed results (R1,  R2 and  R3) on the robust result about the future
temperature RM.  The  abstraction  is  made  for  expositional  purposes  only,  and  I  will
briefly return to the more realistic representation (5E) at the end of the paper.
Climate  models  are  confirmed  when  their  consequences  are  shown  to  fit  with  the
various pieces of evidence. If such confirmation also accrues to the robust result RM, it
could be said that this result is indirectly confirmed by these pieces of evidence. Had
RM not been derived from several models, it obviously could not have been indirectly
confirmed by the models of which it is not a consequence. Thus, had the modellers
derived these results instead,
10 Climate modellers appear to think that RM is robust, however: 'Models are unanimous in their
prediction of substantial climate warming under greenhouse gas increases, and this warming is of a
magnitude consistent with independent estimates derived from other sources, such as from observed
climate changes and past climate reconstructions' (Randall et al. 2007, p. 601).
11 The history of climate science involves adding various elements to a model that becomes larger and
larger (see Edwards 2010 for an extensive history of climate science). For example, the coupling of
models of the sea and the climate was a major break-through. Modules for vegetation and sea ice, for
example, were then added. One could thus also interpret (6) as the result of successive models. If M1
had been the first model in time, M2 the second, and so on, reality would have been described by M3├
R1, R2, R3 and M2├ R1, R2 but M2⊬,	and M1├ R1 but M1⊬R2,	R3.	
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M1 = (C&A1&A2&A3)├ RM, R1
M2 = (C&A2&A4&A5)├ R2, M2⊬RM                         (7)
M3 = (C&A1&A6&A7)├ R3, M3⊬RM,
E1 would have confirmed RM indirectly only through R1, and the modellers would have
known that E2 and E3 do not confirm RM indirectly. Here, E2 and E3 indirectly confirm
the  assumption  of  a  common  core  C  more  than  the  auxiliaries,  but  RM is indirectly
confirmed only by E1.
As a weaker argument, had the climate modellers not known whether RM could  be
derived from M2 or M3, they would only have known that E1 indirectly confirmed RM
through R1. In other words, if they only knew that
(M1├ R1), (M2├ R2), (M3├ R3),    (8)
| | | |
                         RM     E1             E2              E3
they  would  not  know  that  E2 and  E3 also indirectly confirmed RM. Derivational
robustness may thus broaden the range of empirical evidence that can be brought to
bear on the robust result: only by showing that RM is robust, in other words that it can
be derived from M2 (M3),  can  one  claim  that  E2 (E3)  confirms  RM indirectly. Let[ܧ௜]ܿ௜௥ܴெ	denote the epistemic situation in which Ei indirectly  confirms  RM, and+[ܧ௜ ,ܧ௝]ܿ௜௥ܴெ the epistemic situation in which Ej adds a variety of evidence for RM. If
modellers start with (8) and then derive (6), the epistemic situation changes from[ܧଵ]ܿ௜௥ܴெ to +[ܧଵ,ܧଶ,ܧଷ]ܿ௜௥ܴெ ,                   (IVE)
and robustness confirms RM because it Increases the Variety of Evidence (IVE) for it.
I will now scrutinise the logic of the overall argument more closely, referring to two
counter-arguments that could be presented against my analysis.
3.2 The climate sceptics’ argument and a variety of evidence
I have argued thus far that Laudan’s general theory and the core assumptions in a family
of models have similar functions in the sense that both may be employed in indirectly
confirming results derived from them. As I have also shown, the example combines
elements from both kinds (assumptions and results) of indirect confirmation. One might
argue that combining the two kinds of indirect confirmation is not legitimate because,
although E2 and  E3 confirm  some  sets  of  assumptions,  it  is  not  clear  exactly  which
assumptions are primarily responsible for the robust result, or whether they are the ones
that are primarily confirmed by E2 and E3. Climate sceptics in particular, presumably,
are willing to argue that the indirect confirmation from E2 and E3 should not be allocated
primarily to C, or alternatively that since they take the robust theorem (cp, C├RM) to
be false (and not confirmed by E2 and E3), the confirmation does not flow down to RM.
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Climate models do, of course, incorporate general physical theories such as the Navier-
Stokes equations, but they are not in themselves sufficient for deriving R1 or RM.12 In
contrast, the inference from the theory of continental drift to magnetic alignment and
the climate hypothesis involves auxiliary hypotheses, which are either trivially true
(e.g., ‘The climate on some piece of soil on the earth depends on its location’) or already
known to be rather well confirmed (e.g., ‘Occasionally, lava erupts from volcanoes’).
Hence, the general theory of continental drift rather than the auxiliaries is obviously
responsible for the magnetic alignment and the changing climate.
To further investigate the role of the common core, let us consider the analysis that
would have had to be conducted had there been no assumptions shared by all models.
Assume that, instead of (7), the following models and results had been established.
M’1 = (A1&A2&A3)├ RM, R1,
M’2 = (A4&A5&A6)├ R2, M’2⊬RM and                        (7~)
M’3 = (A7&A8&A9)├ R3, M’3⊬RM.
Now E2 and E3 could not indirectly confirm RM because, given the way in which this
epistemic situation is specified, the modellers would not have had any idea that the
three models were connected to each other. If the robustness of RM were  now
demonstrated they would end up with (6~):
M’1=(A1&A2&A3)├ R1, M’2= (A4&A5&A6)├ R2, M’3= (A7&A8&A9)├ R3  (6~)
┬ | ┬ | ┬ |
 RM                            E1    RM           E2   RM                             E3
E2 now indirectly confirms RM in model M’2, and E3 indirectly confirms RM in model
M’3. The argument from the variety of evidence for robustness thus holds even if the
climate sceptics were right in arguing that the robust theorem is not confirmed. All this
argument requires is at least some degree of independence of evidence (cf. Justus 2012;
Kuorikoski and Marchionni 2016; Schupbach forthcoming). (E1&E2)ciRM>E1ciRM only
if the pieces of evidence are independent with respect to confirmation of the robust
result (i.e. (E1|E2)ciRM =E1ciRM and (E2|E1)ciRM =E2ciRM (see Fitelson 2001)). The
example of lava streaks and climate variability implies that such independence may be
attained at least in some cases in which indirect confirmation is relevant.
The  argument  from  the  variety  of  evidence  is  sufficient  to  provide  a  convincing
response to one specific argument against the idea that robustness may confirm. Many
who argue against its confirmatory virtues admit that it would be confirmatory if the
modeller could ascertain that he or she had tested for the robustness of each possible
alternative auxiliary assumption, and if there were good grounds for thinking that the
true assumption was among those that had been tried.13 It is then pointed out that this
12 The Navier-Stokes equations belong to what modellers often refer to as the ‘physical core’ of climate
models. In this paper, however, the ‘core’ merely refers to CO2 forcing. Katzav (2013) argues that
these equations cannot be confirmed because we know them to be true already (see Yablo 2014, p. 101
for a more general claim to this effect).
13 See Houkes and Vaesen (2012), Odenbaugh (2011), Odenbaugh & Alexandrova (2011) and
Woodward (2006). See Katzav (2013; 2014) for a version of this criticism that is specifically targeted
at climate models. Kuorikoski, Lehtinen & Marchionni (2012) provide a rejoinder to Odenbaugh &
Alexandrova's version of this argument.
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is usually impossible. According to the critics, if the new models are just as idealised
as the old ones, the robustness of the result does not resolve the worries because
idealisations have merely been traded for idealisations. According to the most extreme
form of this argument, the conclusion is that robustness can never confirm anything.
Given that each demonstration of robustness increases indirect confirmation in the
example I discuss above, there is no need to ascertain that one has gone through all the
possible alternatives. If one retains the earlier interpretations of the various auxiliaries
instead of exhaustively studying all parameterizations, M’1 and  M’2 merely test two
different parameterizations for cloud formation A3 and  A5, and two different
parameterizations for turbulence A2 and A6. The confirmatory virtues of robustness are
shown to be independent of whether the possible auxiliary assumptions can be
exhaustively listed or whether the remaining assumptions are acknowledged to include
known falsities, and the extreme form of the argument is shown to be untenable. The
‘true’ auxiliary does not need to be among those that have been tried because the point
of robustness is to show their irrelevance rather than their truth.
There  is  a  grain  of  truth  in  the  critics’  argument,  however.  Explaining  what  it  is
necessitates a return to the discussion on the indirect confirmation of the core. Let us
recall what is written in Section 2.7 about the possibility of misidentifying assumptions.
Insofar as being able to list all the possible auxiliaries helps in guaranteeing that
assumptions are not being misidentified, robustness arguments are less prone to error
in allocating confirmation, and the core assumptions may be more indirectly confirmed
simply because robustness analysis is more complete. Similarly, knowing that one
assumption is true may further help in identifying which assumptions drive the results,
but otherwise the truth value of a demonstrably irrelevant assumption has no bearing at
all on how robustness indirectly confirms (assumptions and/or results). Of course, such
truth  values  do  matter  in  the  evaluation  of  the  overall  credibility  of  models,  but  as
mentioned, this is a different matter, and one that is ignored in this paper. Finally, not
being able to test every possible auxiliary with respect to robustness merely means that
the robustness analysis is incomplete. Whether the modellers manage to list all the
possible assumptions and test them for robustness, and whether the truth is among them
are  thus  all  relevant  in  terms  of how much robustness may indirectly confirm.
Unfortunately, however, the critics seem to have thought that such knowledge also
constitutes a necessary condition for any epistemic benefit from robustness.
Had the critics formulated the argument by noting that robustness cannot conclusively
show the truth, or even always establish a high probability of a result, they would have
been right. Unfortunately, however, many of them have drawn the stronger conclusion
that robustness cannot be used in an evaluative way at all, and have neglected the
possibility that it may confirm in the sense of justifiably increasing the modellers’
degree of belief in the truth of the result.
The most recent IPCC report confidently argues the following.
The instrumental records associated with each element of the climate
system are generally independent … and consequently joint interpretations
across observations from the main components of the climate system
increases the confidence to higher levels than from any single study or
component of the climate system. The ability of climate models to replicate
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observed changes (to within internal variability) across a wide suite of
climate indicators also builds confidence in the capacity of the models to
simulate the earth's climate. (Bindoff and Stott 2013, p. 10-68)
Bindoff and Stott’s argument, which is based on a wealth of evidence (see also Lloyd
2012), is relevant to confirming the robust prediction RM because each confirming piece
of evidence is relevant, even if it is impossible to check whether the true auxiliaries are
among those that the climate modellers have tried, and even if climate models
undoubtedly continue to contain false auxiliaries.
The more closely the models approach unanimity in their predictions about future
climate change, the weaker is the case of the climate sceptic. Were climate models not
robust with respect to this prediction14, sceptics could accept results and evidence such
as R2, R3, E2, and E3, but note that emissions policy does not need to change because
there is nothing to show any potential effect on the future climate. On the other hand,
if the real situation were described by something like (6~) rather than (6), the sceptic
could continue to oppose measures to control emissions because the connection
between greenhouse gases and future temperatures would not have been established.
Indeed, (6~) raises the question of why RM is a consequence of a set of dissimilar models
(cf. Houkes and Vaesen 2012; Stegenga 2012). Thus, although the argument from the
variety of evidence is cogent in showing that robustness may confirm, it is insufficient
in itself to justify a strict emissions policy.
Given that many results have already been derived from earlier models, finding entirely
new indirect evidence may be a rare occurrence. Consequently, the argument from the
variety of evidence alone may not be empirically very important. Furthermore, given
that there is no core in (6~), let alone a general theory T as in (1), one might argue that
the  indirect  confirmation  of  results  is  very  weak:  (6~) raises a question rather than
providing a solid argument for indirect confirmation. Therefore, if the argument from
the variety of evidence is stripped to its bare bones as in (6~),  it  is  not a very strong
argument  for  the  confirmatory  virtues  of  robustness.  However,  it  continues  to  be
relevant because, as I show in the next section, a given demonstration of robustness
may well strengthen the indirect confirmation of a robust result and increase the
relevant evidence simultaneously. Then the argument from the variety of evidence is
reinforced by the strengthening of the robust theorem, and it depends on the epistemic
situation (8) rather than the problematic (6~).
The climate sceptics’ argument gains credibility if there is a plausible theoretical
alternative to C, in other words if something other than greenhouse gases is responsible
for the confirmed results R1, R2, and R3. Take, for example, the alternative theory T’
that the observed temperature increase (E1) may be attributable to changes in the
radiation activity of the sun S (or alternatively, to internal variability). Given that the
radiation hypothesis also needs auxiliaries to derive R1, what could be available is
something like model MS= (S&A7&A8├R1).
Indirect confirmation through robustness does not necessarily mean that modellers are
able to pinpoint one assumption that is responsible for the robust result. Climate models
14 As I have shown (see fn. 9), there are slightly different estimates of the sensibility of the climate to
different forms of forcing.
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always include radiation from the sun S and a host of other variables - U (aerosols), V
(volcanoes), and so on - meaning that they have thus far been represented in an
extremely simplified way. Indeed, as noted already, the mechanism responsible for the
increase in temperature involves radiation from the sun. Suppose that instead of (5), the
following results are available:
M11 = (C&S&U&V&A1&A2&A3)├ RM
M12 = (C&S&U&V&A2&A4&A5)├ RM                        (5’)
M13 = (C&S&U&V&A1&A6&A7)├ RM,
E1, E2, and E3 would continue to indirectly confirm RM if an equivalent of (6) were to
hold for such models:
(M11├ R1), (M12├ R2), (M13├ R3)                        (6’)
┬ | ┬ | ┬ |
                        RM     E1      RM     E2      RM     E3.
The conjunction C&S&U&V would be indirectly confirmed just as C was in the above
example. Such a lack of independence between the models would mean, however, that
although some auxiliary hypotheses could be ruled out as causes of global warming, it
would still not be clear exactly what caused it because many candidates would remain.
If this were how things stood, nobody would know what was responsible for RM merely
from looking at the data and the derivational relationships. These observations together
with the huge number of assumptions in global climate models could help to explain
why modellers may justifiably continue to think that the absolute confirmation of RM
is not very strong.
Let us consider a pessimistic scenario. The modellers’ background knowledge indicates
that all models in an ensemble omit or very poorly represent a process they believe is
important for accurately predicting the value RM. Suppose also that all the models in
the ensemble give the same prediction RM, and that they manage to yield correct results
on other aspects of the system, as in (6’). Now, however, each model also contains a
large number of auxiliaries that are known to be false, and that are included in every
model: Ax1, Ax2,…Axn.
M11 = (C&S&U&V&Ax1&Ax2&,…,&Axn&A1&A2&A3)├ RM, R1
M12 = (C&S&U&V&Ax1&Ax2&,…,&Axn&A2&A4&A5)├ RM, R2   (5x)
M13 = (C&S&U&V&Ax1&Ax2&,…,&Axn&A1&A6&A7)├ RM, R3
RM continues to be indirectly confirmed by the other results. Now, however, robustness
analysis is very far from being complete. Obviously, the further it is from being
complete, the more likely it is that the inference that the confirmed results R1, R2 and
R3 indirectly confirm RM is erroneous: if the modellers find it plausible that some
assumption in Ax1&Ax2&,…,&Axn could be responsible for RM, they will think that RM
is very weakly confirmed by R1, R2 and R3. Thus, if they have strong reasons to believe
that some assumptions in Ax1&Ax2&,…,&Axn rather than C is responsible for RM, they
may think that RM is rather weakly confirmed in an absolute sense. They can learn more
by deriving further results with and without the various components. If they are right
about some of Ax1&Ax2&,…,&Axn being responsible for RM,  they  should  be  able  to





Given that global models are huge, they carry an enormous number of assumptions.
Hence, any judgment concerning how strongly RM is confirmed in an absolute sense
requires an enormous amount of information on the assumptions needed for deriving
various results, and on the empirical evidence of those results. I have almost nothing to
say in this paper about how strongly RM is confirmed in such an absolute sense. Climate
scientists may judge how many false assumptions enter all the models, and how
seriously  false  they  are,  for  example.  I  only  show  how  robustness  is  used  in  the
modelling process.
Suppose now that modellers show RM to be a robust result (5), and that the evidence
indirectly confirms this, even though the alternative theory T’: S├R1 is  true  and  the
anthropogenic hypothesis (C├RM and C├R1)  is  false.  The false theory could survive
for a while, but sooner or later the modellers would be able to construct models that do
not include the core C but would predict the data E1, E2, and E3. As a matter of fact,
however, climate modellers have repeatedly tested models with and without
anthropogenic forcing, and have found that natural (solar and volcanic) forcing alone
is incapable of explaining the observed temperature rise between 1860 and 2010.15 The




Taking aerosols into account yields an even worse fit because their net effect is
commonly taken to be cooling. MS should also have some independent evidence that
cannot be counted in favour of the anthropogenic hypothesis. In other words, if (6) has
already been established, the alternative theory T’ should be able to explain not just E2,
and  E3,  but  also  some  further  results  -  E4,  E5 and so on - which the anthropogenic
hypothesis cannot explain.
Given that Lloyd (2015) discusses confirmatory robustness in climate models, I am
obliged to discuss the similarities with and differences from her account. The similarity
lies in the fact that the robust result RM is indirectly confirmed because it is the joint
consequence of the common core structure C in a family of models, and other
consequences of this family are confirmed. However, she emphasises the direct support
15 See e.g., Bindoff and Stott (2013, FAQ 10.1). The report uses these terms to discuss the possibility
that another alternative account might explain the observed global warming, the idea that internal
variability alone is sufficient: ‘…we conclude that it is virtually certain that internal variability alone
cannot account for the observed global warming since 1951’ (p. 22). See Parker (2010a) for a
philosophical analysis of fingerprint results from attribution studies that derive results like (5’’).
16 Despite such results, the attribution to greenhouse gases is not perfect because climate-simulation
models have hundreds of thousands of lines of computer code, and some parts of it have remained the
same for decades. Insofar as all the code is not checked, it is still possible in principle that errors in it
could generate the confirmed results.
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for the various individual assumptions rather than the results derivable from the models.
Recall that A3 and A5 denote different parameterizations of cloud formation. Let EA3
and EA5 denote directly confirming pieces of evidence for them. If one disregards the
fact that Lloyd also considers results derived from the whole model, her argument could
be presented as follows: Suppose that modellers start with (L):
M1=(C&A1&A2&A3), M2=(C&A2&A4&A5).           (L)
┬ ┬ ┬
RM                       EA3                               EA5
and then derive (L’)
M1=(C&A1&A2&A3), M2=(C&A2&A4&A5).           (L’)
┬ ┬ ┬ ┬
RM                       EA3   RM                       EA5
Insofar as A3 (A5) alone is sufficient for deriving EA3 (EA5), this piece of evidence could
not indirectly confirm C, but it can indirectly confirm RM. Deriving RM from M2 does
indeed indirectly confirm RM because it shows that a new piece of evidence (EA5) is
relevant for RM. Note that in the epistemic situation (8),
M1=(C&A1&A2&A3)├ R1, M2=(C&A2&A4&A5)├ R2, M3=(C&A1&A6&A7) ├ R3,
┬ | | | (8)
RM                                 E1 E2                      E3
the structure of indirect confirmation already exists, albeit in a very weak form: there
is a link (in bold) from E2 to C in model M2 and a link from C to RM in model M1. In
contrast, (L’) literally creates the structure for indirect confirmation (of results)
precisely because EA5 does not indirectly confirm C. In principle, then, there is Lloydian
confirmation from directly supported auxiliaries to the robust result.
However, if there is a derivation that shows RM to be derivable without Ai, it shows that
Ai cannot be needed for deriving RM (this  will  be  denoted  as  Ai⊬cRM). Alternative
parameterizations such as A3 and A5 are usually assumed to be mutually incompatible
assumptions (Parker 2006). This diminishes the force of Lloyd’s account considerably
because such assumptions cannot be necessary for deriving RM, either. This, in turn,
implies A3⊬c	RM and A5⊬cRM, and consequently, neither of them confirms RM.
On the other hand, I do not see any particular reason why one should restrict an account
of confirmatory robustness to cases in which the auxiliaries are incompatible: direct
evidence supporting any assumption that always takes part in deriving RM indirectly
confirms RM. Similarly, direct evidence that is contrary to any assumption that always
takes part in deriving RM indirectly disconfirms RM. This is just stating the obvious fact
that the overall credibility of RM depends on the truth of all the assumptions of climate
models.
3.3 Strengthening the robust theorem
Whereas climate critics must be able to show why each climate model yields the
prediction of a future increase in temperature (which they think is erroneous), it may be
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obvious to someone who already accepts the anthropogenic hypothesis that all climate
models incorporating greenhouse-gas forcing imply this prediction (cp, C├RM). If
greenhouse gases increase the absorption of longwave radiation, and if this is
responsible for the increase in temperature, then it should be responsible for such
increases in the future as well.
Another possible counter-argument is thus that robustness is not really needed for
indirectly confirming RM because E2 and E3 indirectly confirm it irrespective of whether
it is a robust result or only derivable from M1. This is because evidence E2 and  E3
indirectly confirms C even in diagram (8), and E2 and E3 thus indirectly confirm RM as
soon as one shows it to be derivable from M1 (but of course, (7) cannot hold). In contrast
to the previous counter-argument, this one presupposes that it is possible to allocate the
indirect confirmation from E2 and E3 to C rather than the auxiliary assumptions, even
without robustness.
This argument rests on the assumption that one already knows that C implies RM. Let
us consider what would happen if the interpretations of C and RM were modified such
that C alone entailed RM. For example, if the modellers first knew
M1=(C&A1&A2&A3)├ R1,    (9)
┬ |
       RM                           E1
and then derived
M2=(C&A2&A4&A5)├ R2,   (9’)
┬                             |
        RM                  E2
E2 would increase the indirect confirmation of RM because the epistemic situation
would change from
            E1 ܿ௜௔  C       +[E1,E2] ܿ௜௔  C.  (10)
┬ to ┬
                     RM                         RM
(10) shows that (9’) increases the indirect confirmation of RM, but this increase is to be
attributed solely to the increase in the relevant evidence. It is thus not the robustness
that changes the epistemic situation and confirms here, but rather deriving the new
result  R2. This counterfactual example shows that robustness is not necessary for
increasing the variety of evidence.
What, exactly, is the role of the robustness of RM in the inference that E2 and  E3
indirectly confirm it in (6)? I have described climate modellers as if they first
demonstrated the robustness of RM and then moved from the epistemic situation (5) to
(6) by way of deriving the new results R2 and R3 and finding evidence E2 and E3 for
them. Let us consider how the example would have had to be analysed if the order of
deriving various results had been different. Suppose that the modellers were only
concerned at first with modelling the historical development of the climate. They would
have started by deriving
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M1=(C&A1&A2&A3)├ R1.                        (8a)
                 |
                 E1
Suppose that they then derived
M2=(C&A2&A4&A5)├ R2,                        (8b)
   |
                 E2
and
M3=(C&A1&A6&A7)├ R3.                        (8c)
                 |
                 E3
Note that (8a) already implies at least some indirect assumption confirmation for C.
Further, (8b) and (8c) show that it has more indirectly confirming evidence than any of
the auxiliaries: [ܧଵ,ܧଶ,ܧଷ]ܿ௜௔ܥ, [ܧଵ,ܧଷ]ܿ௜௔ܣଵ, [ܧଵ,ܧଶ]ܿ௜௔ܣଶ, [ܧଵ]ܿ௜௔ܣଷ, [ܧଶ]ܿ௜௔ܣସ and
so on. Deriving RM from M1 now yields the epistemic situation depicted in (8), and RM
becomes indirectly result-confirmed by E1: ܧଵܿ௜௥ܴெ. So far there would not have been
any robust results.
Each demonstration of derivational robustness would now have increased the indirect
confirmation  of  RM by way of making it more likely that C was necessary for its
derivation. Let x├◊cy stand for ‘it is possible that x is needed for deriving y’. Let us
write (8) as follows.
M1=(C&A1&A2&A3)├ R1, M2=(C&A2&A4&A5)├ R2, M3=(C&A1&A6&A7) ├ R3
┬◊c ┬◊c ┬◊c ┬◊c | | | (8)
       RM  RM  RM  RM     E1                                         E2                    E3
Suppose that RM is now derived from M2. This means that A1, A3, A4 and A5 cannot be
necessary for RM, and that C and A2 are more likely to be necessary for its derivation.
The effect of this derivation can thus be depicted as follows: A1⊬cRM,  A3⊬cRM,
A4⊬cRM, A5⊬cRM, and
M1=(C&A1&A2&A3)├ R1, M2=(C&A2&A4&A5)├ R2, M3=(C&A1&A6&A7) ├ R3
      +┬c       +┬c |         +┬c +┬c | |(8-6)
        RM        RM            E1         RM  RM                     E2                     E3
The empty space beneath A1 and  A3, for example, thus means that they cannot be
responsible for RM. Note that deriving M2├RM strengthens the robust theorem
(C+├cRM), and this increases the indirect confirmation E1 indirectly confers on RM in
model M1.  A  result  of  model  M1 is confirmed by analysing the derivational
relationships in another model M2. Robustness thus confirms ‘across models’. This can
be expressed as follows: [ܧଵ]+ܿ௜௥ܴெ because M2├RM implies C+├cRM if the modellers
have already derived M1├RM, and C+├cRM implies [ܧଵ]+ܿ௜௥ܴெ provided that R1 cannot
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be derived without C. Finally, deriving RM from M3 establishes a further increase in
indirect result confirmation: A2⊬cRM, and
M1=(C&A1&A2&A3)├ R1, M2=(C&A2&A4&A5)├ R2, M3=(C&A1&A6&A7) ├ R3
      +┬c |           +┬c |          +┬c |  (6)
        RM                          E1          RM                          E2         RM                     E3
In short, this derivation establishes that the previously established indirect assumption
confirmation from E1, E2, and E3 to C also accrues to the robust result RM.
I have already shown that if the three models are entirely independent of each other as
in (6~), derivational robustness confirms merely through increasing the variety of
evidence but not through strengthening the robust theorem. C is more strongly
confirmed indirectly in (6) than any of the assumptions in (6~) because each of E1, E2,
and  E3 indirectly confirms it. Of course, this indirect assumption confirmation has
nothing to do with the robustness of the result RM. Yet, deriving RM from M2 and M3
shows that the core assumptions C rather than some auxiliary assumptions Ai are
primarily responsible for the robust result RM. (6) confirms RM more strongly than (8)
because it makes the connection between the robust result and the confirmed core
‘tighter’ in showing that (7) is  no longer possible.  In short,  (6) confirms RM through
strengthening the robust theorem.
In contrast, if one starts with
M’1=(A1&A2&A3)├ R1, M’2= (A4&A5&A6)├ R2, M’3= (A7&A8&A9)├ R3, (6~~)
┬ | | |
 RM                            E1           E2                                     E3
and then derives (6~)
M’1=(A1&A2&A3)├ R1, M’2= (A4&A5&A6)├ R2, M’3= (A7&A8&A9)├ R3, (6~)
┬ | ┬ | ┬ |
 RM                            E1    RM           E2   RM                             E3
robustness does not strengthen a robust theorem because there is none, but it shows
how new evidence is relevant. Given the difference between (6) and (6~), one might
want to argue that moving from (8) to (6) does not provide a case with new relevant
evidence because the structure for indirect confirmation already exists: recall that E2
and E3 indirectly confirm assumption C, and the link from C to RM exists, even before
RM is shown to be robust:
M1=(C&A1&A2&A3)├ R1, M2=(C&A2&A4&A5)├ R2, M3=(C&A1&A6&A7) ├ R3
┬ | | | (8)
RM                                 E1 E2 E3
However, one could imagine circumstances in which the link between C and R2 or R3
is far from obvious when modellers face an epistemic situation such as (8). It may then
come as a genuine surprise that E2 and E3 can be brought to bear on RM. In such cases,
it seems acceptable to say that robustness increases the set of relevant pieces of
evidence for a result, even though the structure for indirect confirmation already exists
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before its robustness is established: if the links constituting the indirect confirmation
structure (e.g., RM-C-R2-E2 in 8) are so weak that the modellers do not recognise them,
then deriving (6) after (8) does increase the variety of evidence. Whether the effect of
robustness is to be conceptualised as an increase in the variety of evidence or as a
strengthening of the robust theorem depends on the empirical details of the case, and
on the individual modellers’ epistemic situation: recall that climate sceptics believe the
C-RM link is very weak, whereas most IPCC reports give the impression that it is rather
strong. This means that climate sceptics would conceptualise this example in terms of
increasing the variety of evidence, and if they were to remain genuinely unconvinced
about anthropogenic climate change they could claim, for example, that the real
situation is closest to (6’).
On the other hand, insofar as one thinks that the original epistemic situation (8) does
not already create the structure for indirect confirmation, robustness confirms RM via
two routes in (6): by strengthening the robust theorem and increasing the relevant
evidence. Pirtle et al. (2010, p. 355) seem to take the fact that ‘some features, such as
forcing from the main greenhouse gases are shared across all models’ as an argument
against  the  confirmatory  power  of  robustness.  If  I  am  right  about  why  and  how
robustness confirms, such a lack of independence is necessary for the second kind of
indirect confirmation through strengthening the robust theorem, and it reinforces rather
than weakens the indirect confirmation of the robust result.
Robustness could confirm even if there were no new relevant data. To explain this more
clearly, I will consider a variation of the example in which there is only old evidence.
Here, unlike in the previous example, robustness increases the indirect assumption
confirmation. Suppose now that the modellers start with M1├RM. They then derive (8a’)
M1=(C&A1&A2&A3)├ R1, (8a’)
┬                |
RM             E1
and (8b’)
M2=(C&A2&A4&A5)├ R1.                      (8b’)
                 |
                 E1
They then show the robustness of RM by deriving M2├RM so that they end up with (8’).
M1=(C&A1&A2&A3)├ R1, M2=(C&A2&A4&A5)├ R1
      +┬c       +┬c |          +┬c +┬c | (8’)
       RM         RM            E1           RM  RM                  E1
The  robustness  of  RM now  strengthens  the  indirect  confirmation  of  RM by  E1 by
strengthening the robust theorem (C+├cRM).  The  robustness  of  R1 strengthens the
indirect assumption confirmation of the core,  (i.e.,  the  link  between  C  and  the
confirmed result R1: C+├cR1), and thereby also strengthens the indirect confirmation
of  RM by  E1. The core can thus be assumption-confirmed by deriving previously
confirmed results from it as in (8), and by robustness as in (8’).
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The new epistemic situation could also be described as follows:
                     (C&A2)+├cR1.
                        +┬c |                       (11)
                         RM         E1
It is also possible to recall SICC and SRT from section 2.7 and write:
P(RM|(C&A2)+├cRM&(C&A2)+├cR1) > P(RM).
Orzack and Sober (1993) argue that the robustness of a directly confirmed result (say
R1) does not add any confirmation to this result over and above what the direct evidence
(here E1) already confers. They are right, but robustness may increase the indirect
assumption-confirmation of the core and thereby increase the indirect confirmation of
another result (RM) if it, too, is robust (i.e., if it can be derived from both M1 and M2).
Let us thus consider another counterfactual order of deriving results to show that
demonstrating the robustness of a result for which there is direct confirming evidence
may also confirm. Suppose that modellers start with (8a’).
M1=(C&A1&A2&A3)├ R1. (8a’)
┬                  |
                  RM                E1
Deriving (2’’*)
M2= (C&A2&A4&A5)├RM                                           (2’’*)
confirms  RM only insofar as the assumptions needed to derive R1 are also needed to
derive RM. Then, deriving R1 from M2 also leads us to (8’). This derivation confirms
RM by making it more likely that C is really needed for deriving R1. Note that deriving
R1 from M2 increases the indirect assumption confirmation of the core (i.e., E1+ܿ௜௔C)
when (8a’) and (2’’*) are already available, but this increase would not confirm RM if
the robust theorem had not been strengthened earlier by demonstrating the robustness
of RM. Here, demonstrating the robustness of a directly confirmed result R1 indirectly
confirms another result RM, but if and only if that other result is robust as well.
This observation gives good reason to briefly revisit the more realistic representation
of climate-model ensembles, one in which they generate large numbers of results:
(M1├ RT,RH,RP,…,R1), (M2├ RT,RH,RP,…,R2), (M3├ RT,RH,RP,…,R3),
 ┬ | | | | ┬ | | | | ┬ | | | |    (5E)
RM     ET EH  EP    E1      RM   ET  EH  EP      E2    RM   ET  EH  EP      E3
Insofar as the confirmed results really are multiply robust in this way, they all contribute
to indirectly confirming RM.
Strengthening the robust theorem may increase the indirect confirmation of RM from a
given piece of evidence irrespective of whether the evidence has been made relevant
(i.e.,  new)  by  demonstrating  the  robustness  of  RM, or  whether  it  was  known  to  be
relevant (i.e., old) beforehand. The variety of evidence can be increased without
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strengthening the robust theorem, and the robust theorem may be strengthened without
adding relevant data. Thus, although both arguments seem to apply to some climate
models, they are almost independent of each other. The reason why this independence
claim must be qualified is the difference between (L’) and (8) I noted earlier: (L’)
literally creates the structure for indirect result confirmation, whereas it exists in a weak
form in (8).
If increasing the variety of evidence occurs without a core, it is very weak. However,
as I have shown, it may occur simultaneously with strengthening the robust theorem.
Indeed, the latest IPCC report describes the situation as follows:
Human influence has been detected in the major assessed components of
the climate system. Taken together, the combined evidence increases the
level of confidence in the attribution of observed climate change, and
reduces the uncertainties associated with assessment based on a single
climate variable.17 From this combined evidence it is virtually certain that
human influence has warmed the global climate system. (Bindoff and Stott
2013, p. 7, modified emphasis)
If CO2 increases in the atmosphere are attributable only to human influence, Bindoff
and Stott’s claim is that C is indirectly confirmed not merely by E1 but also by ET, EH,
EP, E2, E3 and so on. They thus argue that the variety of evidence increases confidence
in the hypothesis that  C is the cause of R1.  However,  I  have shown that a variety of
evidence can be increased without robustness. Is this the case here? If robustness were
not involved, for example, one could describe the claim as follows.
M1=(C&A1&A2&A3)├ R1, M2=(C&A2&A4&A5)├ R2, M3=(C&A1&A6&A7) ├ R3
┬ | | |  (12)
                   RT               E1                                         E2                    E3
and
M1=(C&A1&A2&A3)├ R1, M2=(A2&A4&A5)	⊬R2, M3=(A1&A6&A7) ⊬ R3
┬ | | |           (12’)
                   RT               E1                                    E2                                    E3
It is easy to see that although C is indirectly confirmed by E2 and E3 in such attribution
studies, RT is not, unless it is a robust consequence of the models:
M1=(C&A1&A2&A3)├ R1, M2=(C&A2&A4&A5)├ R2, M3=(C&A1&A6&A7) ├ R3
      +┬c |           +┬c |           +┬c |(12bs)
        RT                          E1           RT                          E2          RT                     E3
Here [E2,E3]ܿ௜௥RT,  just  as Bindoff and Stott  claim. In other words,  Bindoff and Stott
combine the argument from the variety of evidence with the argument from
strengthening the indirect confirmation of the core and of the robust theorem.
17 They thus argue that variety of evidence allocates the confirmation to C.
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4. Conclusions
Even though derivational robustness analysis is usually considered a non-empirical
research strategy, I have attempted to develop an account of the way in which it could
be used together with empirical data to increase the confirmation of model results, and
provide an example in which confirmation occurs via robustness: directly confirmed
results for climate-change models indirectly confirm their robust prediction of
increased temperatures in the future because the confirmed results can only be
generated from greenhouse-gas forcing. However, although the analysis in this paper
shows how this robust result is indirectly confirmed, the exact strength with which the
robust prediction is confirmed is best left for climatologists to determine.
Robustness may be necessary for establishing that some data confirm indirectly, and it
may increase the weight of the existing indirect confirmatory evidence for the robust
result. It may thus increase the variety of evidence or the weight of existing
confirmatory evidence, depending on the modellers’ epistemic situation. The
robustness of a directly confirmed result may increase the indirect assumption
confirmation of the core because it allows for the contrastive distribution of the
confirmation provided by a given piece of evidence to individual assumptions. By the
same token, it may show that the core rather than the auxiliaries is necessary to derive
the robust result.
However, robustness does not confirm anything ‘by itself’: only empirical evidence can
do this. Hence, strengthening the robust theorem may always increase the modellers’
confidence in it, but confirms it only if it changes the epistemic situation in the right
way. The epistemic situation must always include a robust result, and another result for
which there is direct evidence that is transferred to the robust result as indirect evidence.
Increasing the weight of existing evidence must also involve strengthening the robust
theorem or increasing the indirect confirmation of the core.
I have also identified various possible features of the epistemic situations that weaken
or remove the indirect confirmation that robustness confers. This may happen
specifically if there is no core, if there is no empirical evidence or if the derivations fail
to allocate confirmation to the core. More generally, it could occur if there is the kind
of content-cutting that destroys the indirect confirmation relation, if the core alone is
already known to imply the robust result,  if  the robust result  is  already known to be
true, if the set of common assumptions is so large that it remains difficult to establish
the robust theorem, or if modellers misidentify assumptions. However, it would be
difficult even to formulate let alone understand these qualifications without an account
of why and how robustness may confirm.
Although the degree to which modellers can test possible auxiliaries for robustness
affects the probability of misidentification and thereby possibly the completeness of
robustness, knowing that the ‘true’ assumption is among the tested ones and being able
to test all possible auxiliaries are not necessary conditions for confirmation through
robustness. If robustness confirms indirectly in the way I claim it does, there may well
be an increase in confirmation even when only some auxiliaries have been tried.
However, the larger the set of auxiliaries that remain common to all derivations of a
result,  the  higher  is  the  risk  of  their  being  responsible  for  the  results,  and  of
misidentifying assumptions. Misidentifying assumptions is different from the other
qualifications because, by assumption, modellers do not recognise such failures. They
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are in the position to evaluate the degree to which the other qualifications are relevant
in any specific case, but failing to identify common assumptions in models means that
they have systematically inflated confidence in allocating assumption confirmation to
the core: they will think that the core is excessively assumption-confirmed.
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